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On October 19, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996.2 The Act provided for
permanent reauthorization of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of
1990, 3 which sunset on October 1, 19954 pursuant to its original enactment
period of six years. 5 Senator Carl Levin, sponsor of the bill, lauded the
new Act as a further way for agencies to "listen, find creative solutions and
avoid the sometimes unnecessary big bills and bad blood that come with
courtroom battles," and to "[save] both time and money and [increase]
citizen satisfaction with government." 6 Given the tremendous proliferation
of federal cases in which the government is a party, reauthorization of the
ADR Act is certainly a welcome continuation of ADR in an area in need of
more expedient adjudication methods. 7
1 THE NEw WEBSTER QUOTATION DIcTIoNARY 121 (Donald 0. Bolander ed.,
1987).
2 Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (1996).
3 Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-
583 (1990)).
4 See ADR Act Sunsets, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LrmG. 5 (1996).
5 Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 11, 104 Stat. 2736, 2747-2748 (1990).
6 Clinton Signs Levin's Bill Encouraging Government Innovation, CONG. PRESS
RELEAsES, Oct. 21, 1996, at 1.
7 In 1990, 25% of all federal civil cases involved the government. See Favoring
ADR, Bush Sets Rules to Stem Suits by U.S. Agencies, 10 ALTERNATVES TO THE HIGH
COST OF LrIG. 2 (1992). The caseload faced by administrative agencies constitutes a
significant amount of this burden. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Agency
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While maintaining many of the same provisions of the 1990 Act, the
new law enacts two major changes designed to further agency use of ADR
in suits with private parties. 8 Section 8 permits the use of binding
arbitration, removing the thirty-day "opt-out" provision in the 1990 Act,
which allowed agencies to unilaterally vacate an arbitration award if the
agency found the arbitrator's decision to be disadvantageous to the
government. 9 Section 3 broadens the confidentiality of ADR proceedings
by exempting any dispute resolution communication between a party and a
neutral from the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). 10 Together, these provisions greatly enhance the incentives for
parties involved in agency adjudications to utilize ADR.
This Note asserts that although each of the new provisions of the 1996
Act should attain their intended effect of increasing the use of ADR in
agency adjudications, this progress is likely to occur at the expense of
public accountability. The use of binding arbitration will result in private
arbitrators adjudicating public policy issues, a result which, albeit
constitutional,1" raises serious questions regarding the ability of a private
arbitrator to properly make such determinations in accord with our nation's
basic values.12 Additionally, the exemption of all ADR communications
between the neutral and the parties conflicts with the purpose and intent of
FOIA to provide public disclosure of all government documents except as
Adjudications: Trying to See the Forest and the Trees, 31 FED. B. NEWS J. 383, 384
(1984).
8 In addition to the two major changes considered in this Note, the 1996 Act also
makes a number of other refinements including clarifying the authority of agencies to
hire neutrals on an expedited basis, allowing agencies to accept donated services from
state, local and tribal governments to support an ADR proceeding, adding explicit
authorization for appropriations, removing a ban on Federal employees electing to use
ADR methods to resolve certain personnel disputes, eliminating special paperwork
burdens on contractors willing to use ADR to resolve small claims against the
government under the Contract Disputes Act and removing oversight authority
previously vested in the Administrative Conference of the United States, which has
since been terminated. The Act also permanently reauthorizes federal agency use of
negotiated rulemaking. See 142 CONG. REc. Si 1849 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996).
9 See Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 590(c), 104 Stat. 2736, 2743-2744 (1990) (current
version at 5 U.S.C. § 580 (Supp. 111996)).
10 See 5 U.S.C. § 5740) (Supp.II 1996).
11 See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
12 See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?,
99 HARv. L. Ruv. 668 (1986).
[Vol. 13:1 1997]
THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT OF 1996
specifically provided in nine exemptions to FOIA. 13 While these changes
will undoubtedly lead to a new era of ADR use in the federal government,
this Note posits that the 1996 Act may have gone too far due to its
potentially devastating effects on public accountability.
Section II of this Note presents a brief overview of past use of ADR in
federal agencies, including its use and limitations under the 1990 Act.
Section H explores the effect that the binding arbitration provision will
have on agency use of ADR and demonstrates that, despite the Act's
attempt to exempt public policy issues from the purview of the arbitrator,
such issues will inevitably be decided by private neutrals with undesirable
results. Section IV focuses on the new FOIA exemption by examining
recent FOIA cases which exemplify the willingness of courts to include
ADR communications within FOIA's disclosure exemptions, thus rendering
the new Act's FOIA exemption superfluous and susceptible to abuse.
II. THE USE OF ADR IN FEDERAL AGENCIES TO DATE
The use of ADR methods in agency adjudications commenced even
before the 1990 Act. Numerous agencies subscribed to the ADR movement
of the 1980s by experimenting with ADR programs such as nonbinding
arbitration, mediation, mini-trials and negotiated rulemaking. 14 Success
stories include the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which
used ADR techniques to solve disputes regarding creditors, valuation and
liability, 15 as well as the Army Corps of Engineers, which used mini-trials
to settle various contract claims.16
The 1990 Act resulted in further use of ADR in agency adjudications.
Mediation became especially prevalent in the 1990s, particularly in equal
employment opportunity claims against the federal government. The use of
mediation by the Air Force Civilian Appellate Review Agency resulted in
the settlement of more than half of its equal employment opportunity
13 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1994).
14 See Phillip J. Harter, Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law: The History,
Needs, and Future of a Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REv. 1393, 1395-1403
(1983).
15 See Cathy A. Costantino, FDIC Uses Spectrum of ADR Options to Resolve
Disputes, 39 FED. B. NEws & J. 524, 525 (1992).
16 See Lester Edelman & Frank Carr, The Mini-Trial: An Alternative Dispute
Resolution Procedure, ARB. J., Mar. 1987, at 14.
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complaints. 17 The Federal Aviation Administration also implemented
mediation for use in equal employment opportunity claims.' 8 Nonbinding
arbitration was also utilized by several agencies, particularly in
environmental disputes 19 and in claims faced by the Army Corps of
Engineers. 20 These and other success stories2' convinced Congress as well
as the Bush and Clinton administrations that permanent statutory
reauthorization of ADR mechanisms was essential to the ongoing effort to
streamline government. 22
Despite these achievements, however, there were several perceived
shortcomings in the 1990 Act that limited the use of ADR in agency
adjudications. The biggest impediment was the nonbinding arbitration
clause, which granted agencies thirty days to vacate an arbitrator's
decision. This "trap door" provision of the 1990 Act was inserted during
the hearing stage in order to allay concerns that the establishment of a
binding arbitration award by a private party would raise constitutional
issues over the adjudication of public disputes by unelected, unappointed
private arbitrators. 23 Under the Bush Administration in 1989, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) opined that binding arbitration of agency
17 See Eileen Barkas Hoffman & John A. Wagner, Courtbusters, Gov'T
ExEcUTrnv, Oct. 1993, at 12.
18 See Eye on EEO, 2 ADR NETwoRK (Interagency ADR Working Groups
sponsored by ACUS, Washington, D.C.), June 1994, at 3.
19 See David Singer, The Use of ADR Methods in Environmental Disputes, ARB.
J., Mar. 1992, at 55.20 See ADMiNSTRATvE CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES, IMPLEMENTING THE
ADR ACT: GUIDANCE FOR AGENCY DISPUTE RESOLUTION SPECIALISTS 7 (1992).
21 Other agencies making pervasive use of ADR under the 1990 Act included the
Department of the Navy through its ombudsman program for EEO disputes, and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's use of negotiated rulemaking and mediation. See The
Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution by Federal Agencies: Hearings on S. 1224 Before
the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management and the District of
Columbia of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. 152-162,
190-192 (1995).
22 Both President Bush and President Clinton have issued executive orders
indicating strong support for the use of ADR in federal government. See Exec. Order
No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (1996); Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195
(1991).
23 See The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution by Federal Agencies: Hearings on
S. 971 Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management and the
District of Columbia of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong.
20-21 (1989).
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disputes potentially violated the Constitution in several ways. 24 First,
binding arbitration violated Article II under the Appointment Clause,
because arbitrators often are not federal employees, and thus are not
authorized to make such policy determinations. Moreover, binding
arbitration was thought to violate separation of powers, since the Act in
effect permitted Congress to legislate the use of private parties in
potentially executive roles. 25 DOJ also found binding arbitration to be
contrary to Article IH in that adjudicative powers were conveyed to persons
outside the judicial branch. Finally, DOJ indicated a potential due process
problem because of the higher due process protection generally accorded
private parties subject to a federal suit brought by the federal
government. 26
In 1995, however, DOJ changed its position concerning the
constitutionality of binding arbitration of agency disputes. 27 In its revised
opinion, the Department reasoned that binding arbitration by private parties
is permissible as long as the parties consent, the arbitration agreement
sufficiently details the nature of the remedies available to the arbitrator and
preserves the review of constitutional issues and an Article H court is
accorded review of the arbitrator's findings for fraud, misconduct or
misrepresentation. This saving interpretation by DOJ permitted Congress to
include binding arbitration as part of the 1996 Act. 28
24 See Administrative Dispute Resolution: Hearings on H.R. 2497 Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 35-52 (1990) (statement of William P. Barr,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel).
25 See generally Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983).2 6 See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139-140 (1976).
2 7 See Constitutional Limitations on Federal Government Participation in Binding
Arbitration, 1995 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 17 (Sept. 7, 1995). See also Hugh R.
McCombs & Jeffrey W. Sarles, Arbitration, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1996, at B5.
28 This Note does not address the constitutionality of binding arbitration of agency
disputes. In addition to the abundance of literature already available on this subject,
binding arbitration has for the moment been deemed constitutional by DOJ, and until a
court addresses this issue the binding arbitration provision of the 1996 Act will remain
in effect. The more pertinent inquiry at this juncture, therefore, is whether binding
arbitration is conducive to and appropriate for government use.
For further literature on the constitutionality of binding arbitration, see Richard K.
Berg, Legal and Structural Obstacles to the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution For
Claims For and Against the Federal Government, AGENCY ARE. 43 (ACUS Series No.
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A second perceived problem with the 1990 Act was the lack of an
express FOIA exemption. Under the 1990 Act, ADR communications were
not expressly confidential. Instead, a communication was deemed
confidential only if it fell within one of the nine disclosure exemptions of
FOIA. Among the most notable of these FOIA exemptions are any "inter-
agency or intra-agency" communication, 29 and any "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information." 30 According to critics of the 1990
Act, the lack of an express exemption from FOIA created a "chilling
effect" on the use of ADR in agency adjudications because private parties
and agencies alike were reluctant to use ADR for fear of unwanted public
disclosure. 31
As a result of these shortcomings, the use of ADR has met much
resistance and made a limited impact to date on dispute resolution in federal
agencies. 32 While the parties have moved beyond the traditional manifest
distrust of neutrals,33 the 1990 Act was largely ineffectual. As a result,
many agencies have implemented only cursory ADR programs, and have
indicated no intent to implement these programs further. 34 Even the
88-1, 1988); Harold H. Bniff, Public Programs, Private Deciders: The
Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67 Tx. L. REv. 441 (1989);
Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REv. 81 (1992); Leo
Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration
Experience, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 239 (1987).
29 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994).
30 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1994).
31 See Mark H. Grunewald, Freedom of Information and Confidentiality Under the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 985 (1996).
32 See Cynthia B. Dauber, Note, The Ties That Do Not Bind: Nonbinding
Arbitration in Federal Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 165, 176
(1995).
33 See, e.g., Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
(No. 14,065):
[A]rbitrators ... possess no authority whatsoever, even to administer an oath, or
to compel the attendance of witnesses.... They are not ordinarily well enough
acquainted with the principles of law or equity, to administer either effectually, in
complicated cases; and hence it has often been said, that the judgment of
arbitrators is but rusticumjudicium [a rough or rude judgment].
Id. at 1321.
34 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exemplifies this norm. The
SEC had implemented ADR to a minimal extent, but subsequently announced that it
does not plan to continue to do so if such programs are not mandatory. See Doty Says
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Department of Justice, whose endorsement of the constitutionality of
binding arbitration led in part to the expansion of ADR programs under the
new Act, 35 has evinced a reluctance to implement widespread ADR
programs by utilizing ADR in only three of its divisions since passage of
the 1990 Act. 36
The 1996 Act was therefore enacted with far stronger language than its
predecessor. The binding arbitration and FOIA exemption provisions are
indicative of Congress's desire to overcome this reluctance to use ADR in
agency adjudications. 37 Parties to an ADR proceeding may now freely
utilize arbitration without fear of an eventual reversal of the decision by the
government. 38 Private parties also need no longer fear disclosure of
confidential information via the Freedom of Information Act.39 Certainly,
there appears to be little question that these provisions will lead to
increased use of ADR. The remaining analysis of this Note addresses these
new provisions of the 1996 Act and examines whether their enactment was
truly advisable in light of the negative effect on public accountability that is
likely to arise.
HIL. THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF BINDING ARBITRATION ON AGENCY
ADJUDICATIONS
A. Despite the Act's Exceptions, Policy Issues Inevitably Will be
Resolved by the Arbitrator
The arbitration provision contained in the 1990 Act was unquestionably
ineffectual. Section 590(c) of the Act stated:
The head of any agency that is a party to an arbitration proceeding
conducted under this subehapter is authorized to terminate the arbitration
proceeding or vacate any award issued pursuant to the proceeding before
the award becomes final by serving on all other parties a written notice to
SEC Will Not Use Arbitration, Negotiated Rulemaking in its Activities, 23 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. 910 (1991).
35 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
36 See Ruth Larson, Agencies to Negotiate Spats Over Contracts, WASH. TIMES,
May 17, 1994, at A8.
37 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 574, 580 (Supp. II 1996).
38 See id. § 580.
39 See id. § 5740).
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that effect, in which case the award shall be null and void. 40
Thus, if an agency chose to vacate the arbitration award, the case
would simply revert back to an administrative proceeding, effectively
wiping the record clean between the parties as if the arbitration process had
never taken place. The obvious defect in this statute is that it provides a
private party with absolutely no incentive to engage in an arbitration
proceeding with the federal government. With the government vested with
this no-lose scenario of either winning the arbitration or simply vacating the
decision if it lost, "why would anyone be foolish enough to want to go
through negotiation and go through the expense of a negotiation which
would be nothing more than giving the Government a chance to say I don't
like the award and forcing you all the way back through an administrative
proceeding." 41 The thirty-day opt-out provision was the creation of a
compromis& between the Department of Justice and the American Bar
Association, 42  and was primarily intended to pacify the Justice
Department's concern over the constitutionality of binding arbitration. 43
The result of such a one-sided provision was not surprising; there were no
cases submitted for arbitration over the course of the 1990 Act.44
The 1996 Act obviates this problem by removing the thirty-day opt-out
provision from the Act, thus permitting unfettered binding arbitration to
occur in agency disputes. 45 Congress continued to recognize, however, that
arbitration should not be implemented in all situations and therefore
40 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 590(c),
104 Stat. 2736, 2743-2744 (1990).
41 Administrative Dispute Resolution: Hearings on H.R. 2497 Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 60 (1990) (statement of Representative
James). Assistant Attorney General Barr speculated at that time that the opt-out
provision could actually expand the use of arbitration by allowing government officials
to be "less concerned that they are going to get locked into a position.., if they feel
that there is a safety valve of the review." Id. at 58. Obviously it was not the
government's hesitance to arbitrate that was the problem with the opt-out provision.
42 See id. at 39.
43 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
44 See Reauthorization of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Judiciary
Committee, 104th Cong. 5 (1995) (statement of Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Senior Counsel,
Office of Alternative Dispute Resolution, Department of Justice).
45 See 5 U.S.C. § 580 (Supp. I 1996).
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maintained many of the 1990 Act's restrictions on the use of arbitration. 46
Perhaps the most important of these restrictions is contained in § 572(b)(2),
which bars the use of ADR proceedings in policy-related controversies.
Section 572(b)(2) states:
An agency shall not consider using a dispute resolution proceeding
if-
(2) the matter involves or may bear upon significant questions of
Government policy that require additional procedures before a final
resolution may be made, and such a proceeding would not likely serve to
develop a recommended policy for the agency.47
While this provision may seem sufficiently definitive in prohibiting
agencies from engaging in arbitration of policy-laden disputes,
circumvention of this section is likely to occur for several reasons,
including: (1) political pressure to implement arbitration in agency
adjudications as a means of "streamlining government"; 48 (2) the existence
of predispute arbitration clauses that are phrased excessively broadly to
include policy matters, and which compel its signatories to participate; 49 (3)
the natural tendency of parties to seek arbitration in order to gain
reconciliation and finality in their dispute, resulting in unintentional (or
perhaps intentional) disregard of public policy issues;50 and (4) the
tremendous difficulty in distinguishing claims involving public policy issues
from merely private issues.51 As a result of these factors, § 572(b)(2) is
destined to be often ignored, with the end result being the undesirable
intrusion of private arbitrators into matters of public policy.
46 See 5 U.S.C. § 572(b)(1)-(6) (Supp. II 1996). The 1996 Act requires that the
head of an agency consider each of these factors for every case contemplating the use of
binding arbitration. See id. § 575(c).
47 Id. In addition to policy-related matters, binding arbitration is not permitted
under the statute where a definitive resolution is required for precedential value,
maintaining established policies is required for consistency, the case significantly affects
persons who are not party to the proceeding, a full public record is required or where
the agency must maintain authority to alter the disposition of the matter in light of
changed circumstances and an ADR proceeding would hamper its ability to do so. See 5
U.S.C. § 572(b)(1)-(6) (Supp. II 1996).
48 See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.50 See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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The first factor that is likely to lead to binding arbitration of disputes
containing public policy issues is the inherent political pressure to utilize
binding arbitration in agency disputes. As stated above, the arbitration
provision in the 1990 Act was never actually used due to the apparent
chilling effect that the thirty-day opt-out had on private parties. 52 In order
to provide any hope that arbitration would ever be conducted in agency
disputes, the Justice Department had to provide a saving interpretation of
the constitutionality of binding arbitration of government disputes, leaving
itself open to criticism and, more significantly, eventual judicial review of
the provision. 53 While the Department's interpretation has subsequently
been upheld in a lower court,54 the new position is contrary to that held for
over 150 years by the judiciary and the executive, and is therefore likely to
be controversial at the very least.55 A statement by the Justice Department's
Senior Counsel for Alternative Dispute Resolution before the House
Judiciary Committee made it emphatically clear that the Department and all
other federal agencies are to begin increasing their use of ADR processes,
including binding arbitration:
The Attorney General is ... strongly committed to using alternative
dispute resolution. She issued an order directing all civil litigators to
attempt to make greater use of ADR techniques in their litigation ....
We are working with the agencies ... to encourage them to make greater
use of ADR because, among other things, if those agencies can settle more
cases administratively, then those are fewer cases that come to us for
litigation.56
The White House has also made it known that it is strongly in favor of
the increased use of arbitration. Vice President Gore's National
52 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
53 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
54 See Tenaska Wash. Partners II L.P. v. U.S., 34 Fed. Cl. 434 (1995).
55 The rule that private parties may not decide issues involving the federal
government dates back to decisions handed down in the middle of the nineteenth
century. See U.S. v. Ames, 24 F. Cas. 784, 790 (C.C.C. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,441)
(holding that while arbitration awards involving the federal government are "sometimes
useful," there is "no legal ground on which their execution can be compelled by a court
of law").
56 Reauthorization of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Judiciary
Committee, 104th Cong. 3 (1995) (statement of Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Senior Counsel,
Office of Alternative Dispute Resolution, Department of Justice).
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Performance Review (NPR) included "Encouraging Alternative Dispute
Resolution When Enforcing Regulations" as one of its priorities for
streamlining government.5 7 In a discussion regarding NPR's regulatory
reform recommendations, Jeffrey S. Lubbers, leader of NPR's Improving
Regulatory Systems team, expressed the Clinton Administration's position
on the expanded use of ADR, including arbitration:
President Clinton has issued a directive requiring agencies to examine
their internal rulemaking clearance processes and report in six months on
the steps taken to improve them. It is our hope that the term "alternative
dispute resolution" will soon be a misnomer as various techniques, such as
mediation, arbitration, minitrial, and early neutral evaluation, become part
of agencies' everyday menu for resolving disputes. The acronym ADR
may be preserved by substituting "appropriate" for "alternative."58
This political pressure to use ADR techniques such as binding
arbitration was one of the "practical concerns" enumerated by Assistant
Attorney General Barr in resisting the inclusion of binding arbitration in the
1990 Act.59 Given the paucity of ADR use to date in the 1990s, this
political pressure can only have become more serious at this time, and
therefore the risk of improper use of the binding arbitration provision in
57 See AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GovERNMENT THAT
WoRKs BETTER & CosTs LEss: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REvIEw
322 (1993). See also Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (1996).
58 Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Twenty-Fifth Annual Administrative Law Issue: Better
Regulations: The National Performance Review's Regulatory Reform Recommendations,
43 DuKEL.J. 1165, 1173-1174 (1994).
59 In hearings on the 1990 Act, Assistant Attorney General Barr presented two
concerns regarding binding arbitration: (1) constitutional concerns (see supra notes 27-
28 and accompanying text) and (2) practical concerns-these include the lack of
precedential effect of the arbitrator's decision, lack of special expertise of the arbitrator,
concerns that the arbitrator would rule on policy issues, the tendency of arbitrators to
"split the difference" in adjudicating a dispute that would be disadvantageous to public
funds and that political pressure would lead to inappropriate use of binding arbitration.
According to Barr, "[t]he existence of a procedure for binding arbitration would create
pressure to use that procedure. In many cases, an agency might find it easier to ignore
the need for regularity and precedent and simply turn to binding arbitration as a means
for escaping responsibility." The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution by Federal
Agencies: Hearings on S. 971 Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management and the District of Columbia of the Senate Committee on Government
Affairs, 100th Cong. 92 (1989).
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public policy settings is a most serious concern.
The use of predispute arbitration clauses is a second problem with the
public policy exception. Such clauses are generally effective for ADR
purposes because they provide assurance before a dispute even arises that
ADR methods will be employed. This is traditionally the most prevalent
method of creating arbitration proceedings, as evidenced by arbitrations
organized under the American Arbitration Association, of which ninety-five
percent of its 70,000 arbitrations occur as a result of predispute clauses. 60
The problem with predispute arbitration clauses is that at the time they
are created, the parties cannot predict the nature of their future disputes. 61
As a result, these clauses are phrased broadly in order to encompass any
and all disputes that might arise.62 While § 574(b)(2) of the 1996 Act states
that policy-laden disputes are not to be tried before an arbitrator, conflict
will naturally result from these broadly phrased arbitration provisions, as
courts are reluctant to allow parties to back out of such contractually-
binding provisions. In Gemco LatinoAmerica Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp.,63
for example, the court permitted an antitrust claim, a claim that would
seem to involve substantial policy issues, to go to arbitration, holding that
the dispute did not sufficiently implicate policy in light of the predispute
arbitration clause. 64
The sanctions for parties who refuse to arbitrate despite the existence of
predispute clauses are often severe. 65 An outright refusal to arbitrate may
result in the award of costs and fees incurred by the opposition in the
arbitration and all related proceedings, 66 or even the loss of the right to trial
de novo. 67 In one case, the defendant simply elected not to attend the
arbitration in defiance of a court order and local court rules. 68 The court
60 See Ted E. Pons, AAA Business Expanded in 1993, Disp. R.SOL. TIMES, Spring
1994, at 1.
61 See Dauber, supra note 32, at 187.
62 See id.
63 671 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
64 See id. at 979-980. See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (holding that "having made the bargain to
arbitrate, the party should be held to it"); Dauber, supra note 32, at 187 n. 129.
65 See Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism:
Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DisP. REsOL. 1, 38 (1993).
66 See Gilling v. Eastern Airlines, 680 F. Supp. 169, 171-172 (D.N.J. 1988).
67 See New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 715
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
68 See Gilling, 680 F. Supp. at 170.
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had little difficulty assessing costs and fees against the defendant in this
instance. 69 These sanctions present an obvious dilemma for parties involved
in agency adjudications in which there is a predispute arbitration clause-
consent to arbitrate the policy-laden dispute or face the strong possibility of
severe sanctions for noncompliance. In such a scenario, the immediate
interests of the parties are likely to take precedence over the potential
policy and accountability concerns raised by the use of binding arbitration.
Another factor likely to lead to the arbitration of policy issues is the
parties' natural desire to attain reconciliation because it is in their best
interest financially. Admittedly it will often be the case that binding
arbitration is the best way to bring adverse parties together in gaining the
quickest resolution at the lowest cost to the parties-such is the utility of
arbitration and ADR in general. While this result is normally praiseworthy,
there are some disputes where the failure to "see the forest over the trees"
results in settlements that simply ignore policy issues present in the case.70
A vivid example of such shortsightedness occurred in the consolidated
asbestos litigation, conducted in 1994 between a group of experienced
plaintiffs' lawyers and the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR), a claim-
settling organization utilized by the asbestos defendants. 71 The plaintiffs'
lawyers and CCR negotiated an agreement that established award amounts
for the class of individuals who develop future asbestos-related illnesses.
This settlement may in fact have been the best achievable result for all
concerned under the circumstances, since the suit included numerous
bankrupt defendants and a tremendous backlog of claims.72 Those with
future asbestos illnesses received guarantees of future recompense, 73 and
lawyers for the class greatly benefited financially from the settlement. 74
It is quite evident from the proceedings, however, that the policy issue
69 See id. at 171-172.
70 See Edwards, supra note 12, at 679.
71 See Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
72 It has been estimated that asbestos claims in 1985 composed 31.3% of the entire
federal products liability docket, and accounted for much of the 758% growth in
products liability filings in the federal courts between 1974 and 1985. See Marc
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 24 (1986).
73 See David Luban, Settlement and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEo. L.J.
2619, 2659-2660 (1995).
74 Separating pre-existing claimants from future claimants is estimated to have
increased the fees of the plaintiffs' lawyers by somewhere between 100-250%. See
Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1059-1069 (1995).
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of the optimal means of resolving the asbestos problem was completely
ignored at the expense of the immediate concerns of the actors involved. 75
The settlement agreement included the equivalent of a "lockout agreement"
in which plaintiffs' lawyers agreed not to represent future claimants against
the same defendants in similar cases. 76 Additionally, the class of claimants
established by the plaintiffs' lawyers was structured to exclude pre-existing
clients, whose cases were settled separately under more favorable terms. 77
While one would expect the court to closely scrutinize such an outcome in
defense of the public interest, the court actually accorded little review to
the settlement terms in its apparent eagerness to remove the claims from its
docket. 78 Thus, while the agreement may have been the best result for the
parties at the time it was reached, future ramifications may include under-
compensated victims and nonculpable defendants-hardly an optimal
solution in terms of public policy. Such a specious result is not unique,
however, since parties are naturally inclined to seek the quickest and least
expensive resolution first. The "self-dealing process by which this
particular sausage emerged from the grinder"7 9 was the natural result of the
disputants desire to gain the most efficient resolution. Such outcomes are
likely to be repeated in agency adjudications where binding arbitration
allows a private party to escape a costly court adjudication. As was the case
with the reviewing court in Georgine v. Amchem Products, agencies are
likely to ignore its obligation not to arbitrate policy issues where it can
clear a lingering case from its crowded docket.
Another problem with the public policy exception is that it assumes that
agencies will actually be able to identify cases where public policy issues
exist. Historically, there has never been any definitive boundary delineating
the public and private spheres in this country, nor has any satisfactory
theory emerged to date.80 One distinction is that public rights are created
where the basis for the claim evinces a goal "designed to achieve ends
other than doing justice between the parties to a dispute." 8 The problem
75 See Luban, supra note 73, at 2659-2660 (1995).
76 See id. at 2660.
77 See id. at 2659.
78 One commentator has referred to the settlement terms as "tainted" and approved
"to help rid the court system of the terrible burden imposed by what appears to be
interminable asbestos litigation." Id. at 2660.
79 Id.
80 See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1423, 1426-1427 (1982).
81 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration
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with this distinction is that nearly all statutes and actions under common
law seek to "govern and mold conduct" in some way, as there is a "'social'
or 'public' interest in the average commercial contract dispute just as in a
securities claim or a civil rights claim."82 Thus, to arbitrarily divide public
from private law "would ignore the social values and the legal development
present even in disputes traditionally viewed as involving private law. "83
Recent developments in the law have also served to blur this
distinction. One such trend is the privatization of government functions.
Statutory corporations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and Amtrak
perform functions which contain obvious policy ramifications, yet are often
conducted among purely private actors. 84 Another development that leaves
the public-private law distinction unavailing is the annex of traditionally
private law domains into statutory law. 85 Many areas traditionally viewed
under private law such as contract, tort, property, agency, landlord-tenant,
family and commercial law have now been codified by legislatures driven
by public policy concerns. 86 Will cases in these areas be subject to binding
arbitration under the 1996 Act merely because they are traditionally not
part of the public law? If Congress hopes to truly enforce the public policy
exception, it must require the agency to take a hard look at the case before
it in order to ensure that policy issues are not at hand. While such a
directive may be theoretically possible, it seems inevitable that disputes
laden with policy issues will come before binding arbitration by a private
neutral.
Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 351 (1990).
82 Id.
83 Daniel Misteravich, The Limits of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Preserving the
Judicial Function, 70 U. DEfT. MERCY L. REv. 37, 44 (1992).
84 See Bruff, supra note 28, at 458. See also John T. Tierney, Government
Corporations and Managing the Public's Business, 99 POL. SC. Q. 73, 75 (1984).
85 See Horwitz, supra note 80, at 1426. See also GuEno CALABRsi, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
86 See Misteravich, supra note 83, at 44-45.
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B. The Negative Implications of Private Parties Resolving Public
Policy Disputes
But why should society care if a private arbitrator happens to have a
say in a public policy matter from time to time? After all, society already
vests a significant quasi-judicial authority in the arbitrator by enabling him
to decide cases that have substantial effects on the lives of private parties
and the government-why not give the arbitrator a shot at lawmaking as
well? There are several important reasons why private arbitrators should
not decide policy issues. Permitting such arbitration implicates: (1)
procedural concerns, because arbitrators are not required to provide any
rationale for their decision;87 (2) institutional concerns, since the only
check on the arbitrator's decision is judicial review, which has become
increasingly deferential to the opinion of arbitrators;88 and (3) substantive
concerns, due to the conflict between the values of the arbitrator and those
of the nation as a whole. 89
An initial problem with vesting private arbitrators with the power to
decide policy issues is that the arbitrator often lacks the requisite
knowledge to properly make a determination. It is a common maxim that
the "specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of
the shop, not the law of the land." 90 Furthermore, there is no requirement
that arbitrators apply the applicable laws to the dispute, nor that they even
be lawyers. Thus, arbitrators are often "wholly unqualified to decide legal
issues, and even if qualified to apply the law, not bound to do so."91
Procedurally, one shortcoming of the arbitration process is its
informality. While this also serves as a strength in enabling parties to avoid
some of the constraints of a court adjudication, the informality of the
arbitration process fails to ensure that the arbitrator's decision is based on
reasoning in accord with sound public policy. The record of the arbitration
proceeding is less complete, the usual rules of evidence do not apply and
rights and procedures common to all civil trials, such as discovery,
compulsory process, cross-examination and testimony under oath are often
87 See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
88 See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
89 See infra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
90 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
91 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting).
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severely limited or unavailable. 92
Perhaps the biggest procedural weakness of arbitration in terms of
public policy adjudication is the failure to require arbitrators to provide a
rationale for their decision. As stated by one scholar:
In public-law disputes, greater weight deserves to be placed on [providing
a rationale for the decision]: more urgent and nonnegotiable public policies
will typically be at stake, and the employer's future conformity to
statutory norms becomes much more pertinent. Moreover, there is
presumably a greater need in public-law disputes to assure that arbitration
decisions conform to law and are amenable to minimal judicial review,
objectives that would be frustrated were such decisions terse and
opaque. 93
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,94 the Court held that
arbitration awards need only "be in writing" and contain "the names of the
parties, a summary of the issues in controversy, and a description of the
award issued" and that such awards be "made available to the public. " 95
These requirements are insufficient for policy disputes, which require the
decision-maker to alert the parties and the public at large of the
considerations that underlie the decision. When public policy matters are at
issue, the public has a right to know the policy basis on which the case has
been decided. The lack of a rationale requirement therefore makes
arbitration an unsatisfactory forum for disputes concerning policy.
Another major problem with permitting private arbitrators to decide
policy issues is the lack of a sufficient institutional check on the arbitrator's
decision. While the practice of allowing private arbitrators to decide policy
issues is itself objectionable, it would be much less problematic, especially
from an accountability perspective, if a meaningful, "hard look" approach
was taken of the arbitrator's action by the reviewing court.96 Unfortunately,
this is not the case.
Review of binding arbitration awards under the 1996 Act is handled
under the terms of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 97 The power given
92 See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57-58.
93 Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public
Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 666.
94 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
95 1d. at 31-33.
96 See Gorman, supra note 93, at 669-670.
97 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
to courts under the FAA is extremely narrow. 98 Rather than providing any
scrutiny over the arbitrator's substantive decision, review of arbitrator
decisions is limited to corruption, fraud or undue means in procuring the
award, obvious partiality, prejudice or corruption by the arbitrator and acts
which otherwise exceed their delegated power. 99 While some of the
language of the FAA could be construed expansively, including the court's
ability to overturn an award because of "misconduct" of the arbitrator, this
provision has been interpreted quite narrowly by the courts. 100 The end
result is the lack of any real scrutiny of the arbitrator's decision.101
Perhaps the most fundamental defect in permitting a private arbitrator
to decide public policy issues is the potential conflict between the
arbitrator's values and those of the community at large. As stated by Judge
Edwards:
[I]f ADR is extended to resolve difficult issues of constitutional or
public law-making use of nonlegal values to resolve important social
issues or allowing those the law seeks to regulate to delimit public rights
and duties-there is real reason for concern. An oft-forgotten virtue of
adjudication is that it ensures the proper resolution and application of
public values 102
Thus, arbitration is simply not appropriate where policy issues are at
stake, as "often our nation's most basic values.., conflict with local
nonlegal mores."10 3 Examples of this conflict appeared in the Boston
98 See Gorman, supra note 93, at 670.
99 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
100 See Gorman, supra note 93, at 670. See also Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (upholding an arbitrator's instructions to enforce public
law obligations). While the Court has held that arbitral awards may be reversed if
decided contrary to "explicit" public policy, i.e. contained in "laws and legal
precedents," arbitration decisions may not be overturned based on "general
considerations of supposed public interests." W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759,
Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757,
766 (1983).
101 The Supreme Court's deferential review of arbitration decisions differs from
judicial review in many state courts, where judges are able to subject the award to a
higher level of judicial review. See, e.g., Faherty v. Faherty, 477 A.2d 1257, 1262-
1263 (N.J. 1984) (conducting a de novo review of arbitral awards of child support).
102 Edwards, supra note 12, at 676. Judge Edwards is currently the Chief Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
103 Id. at 677.
[Vol. 13:1 1997]
THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT OF 1996
desegregation battle, as well as in the civil rights conflicts in the South in
the 1960s, where the basic American value of equal justice under the law
conflicted with local court mores. 1°4 A current example of this problem
exists in the negotiation of toxic waste disputes. 10 5 While the expedient
resolution of these disputes may be to the advantage of the parties involved,
negotiations that compromise standards created by Congress result in the
"application of values that are simply inconsistent with the rule of law." 106
The use of binding arbitration takes this risk every time a private arbitrator
settles a dispute grounded on a statutory provision. The existence of the
statute represents a policy choice decided by our nation's democratically
elected lawmakers. Even if it would appear to be a good result when parties
come to a middle ground, such middle ground will necessarily represent a
departure from laws that reflect our nation's values. While a private
arbitrator is not compelled to consider the public at large, an agency's role
as representative of the public interest "does not permit it to act as an
umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it;
the right of the public must receive active and affirmative protection."10 7 As
an unelected, unappointed participant in the process, the arbitrator should
not be permitted to fill in for the agency where such public laws are at
stake.
IV. THE NEW FOIA EXEMPTION AND ITS EFFECT ON AGENCY
ADJUDICATIONS
Confidentiality is essential to any ADR process. Whether it be in an
arbitration, mediation or any other type of ADR proceeding, parties will
not be willing to freely divulge information to the neutral unless they
receive assurance that such information will not be leaked to the adverse
party or to the general public. Although this policy may not be
controversial in most areas in which ADR operates, a different dynamic
exists where the government is a party to the litigation. The Freedom of
Information Act requires that agencies disclose certain information to the




107 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir.
1965) (emphasis added).
108 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994).
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serves the public interest and from the further premise that members of the
public have the right to know what government officials are doing. "109
There is thus an inherent conflict present in the degree of
confidentiality to be accorded ADR proceedings in agency adjudications-
the public's right to know versus a party's desire for confidentiality. In
resolving this conflict, the law must strike "a careful balance ... between
the openness required for the legitimacy of many agency agreements and
the confidentiality that is critical if sensitive negotiations are to yield
agreements." 110 In striking this balance under the 1996 Act, however,
Congress appears to have tilted the balance too far to the side of
confidentiality, with openness and public accountability sacrificed as a
result.
The tension between FOIA and agency ADR was not addressed until
the final stages of the hearing process under the 1990 Act. Under the 1990
Act, confidentiality was extended to any dispute resolution communication,
except as specifically identified under the Act. 111 The availability of agency
records under FOIA was not addressed, however, in the original bill. 112
This issue was finally addressed as an amendment on the Senate floor,
submitted by Senator Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Judiciary
subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Freedom of Information Act. While
the Senate had considered adding a FOIA exemption to the 1990 Act,
Senator Leahy was hesitant to take this step due to the potential conflict
with the purpose and intent of FOIA. 113
As a result, § 574(j) was added to the 1990 Act, which provided that
the Act "shall not be considered a statute specifically exempting disclosure"
under FOIA. 114 It is worth noting that without this amendment, the
confidentiality section contained in § 574(a) and (b), would likely have
qualified as a "statute" within the meaning of Exemption 3 of FOIA, and
thus the Act would not have been subject to FOIA. 115 The result of § 574(j)
109 McReady v. Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 618 A.2d 609,
627 (D.C. 1992) (Ferren, J., dissenting).
110 Recommendation 88-11 of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
reprinted in 41 ADMiN. L. REv. 357 (1989).
111 See Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2740-2741 (1990).
112 See id.
113 See 136 CONG. Rnc. S18088 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990). Senator Leahy stated,
"I was unwilling to carve out an exception in this bill from FOIA requirements in the
final days of this Congress. I think such a step requires more deliberation." Id.
114 Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2741 (1990).
115 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1994). One of nine statutory exemptions to FOIA,
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was a "trumping effect" of FOIA over the 1990 Act, 116 with all documents
submitted pursuant to an agency ADR proceeding subject to disclosure
unless exempted by one of nine statutory exemptions of FOIA. 117
Under the 1996 Act, the new § 5740) provides a specific exemption
from FOIA. Section 5740) states that "[a] dispute resolution
communication which is between a neutral and a party and which may not
be disclosed under this section shall also be exempt from disclosure under
§ 552(b)(3)."11 8 This section removes the trumping effect of FOIA by
specifically granting confidentiality to any communication between a party
and a neutral. There are two significant problems with this exemption: (1)
it is superfluous and, most importantly, contrary to the purpose and intent
of FOIA, because FOIA Exemptions 4 and 5 cover every situation in which
a party is properly entitled to confidentiality in an agency ADR
proceeding; 119 and (2) it is subject to abuse by parties to an ADR
proceeding, with the outright exemption for all communications involving
the neutral enabling parties to avoid disclosure of documents otherwise
available to the public in a traditional litigation.120
In analyzing the reasoning behind this change, it must first be noted
that the new FOIA exemption was not created in response to an onslaught
of court cases holding that documents submitted by parties to an agency
ADR proceeding must be mandatorily disclosed. In actuality, quite the
opposite is true; there have been no reported cases in which litigants used
FOIA as the basis for receiving access to an ADR communication. 121 This
result has been described as misleading, however. The argument made by
advocates of the new FOIA exemption is that the newness and complexity
of the 1990 Act rendered parties unable to understand the relationship
between the confidentiality section of the 1990 Act and FOIA. 122 Another
argument offered to explain the lack of FOIA challenges is the chilling
effect that § 5740) of the 1990 Act had on parties, who were discouraged
this section provides an exemption from disclosure by statute where "such statute (A)
requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no
discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to
particular types of matters to be withheld." Id.
116 See Grunewald, supra note 31, at 993.
117 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1994).
118 5 U.S.C. § 5740) (Supp. II 1996).
119 See infra notes 130-164 and accompanying text.
120 See infra notes 165-170 and accompanying text.
121 See Grunewald, supra note 31, at 998.
122 See id. at 998-1000.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
from utilizing ADR due to the risk of disclosure they would face under
FOIA. 123
The first of these contentions, that no cases have arisen due to the
parties' inability to understand the 1990 Act, is unavailing. It is extremely
unlikely that experienced Washington lawyers, who have made their living
zealously representing corporate clients in disputes with the government,
would be unaware of the potential opportunity to use FOIA as a means of
discovering information. Section 5740) could not have been any more
explicit in its directive that FOIA applies to the Act, stating that the Act
"shall not be considered a statute specifically exempting disclosure" under
FOIA.124 Aside from placing this section in large bold print with flashing
lights around it, it seems that this is language that even a novice in
government adjudications could discern, much less experienced
Washington counsel. In short, ignorance of the statute which governs ADR
proceedings in agency adjudications does not adequately explain the
shortage of FOIA controversies under the 1990 Act.
The second explanation suggested for the lack of FOIA challenges
under the 1990 Act is that the absence of a FOIA exemption produced such
a chilling effect due to uncertainty over the types of documents that were
disclosable, that parties were deterred from using ADR. 125 This claim is
substantiated by a number of agency officials, who have testified that
uncertainty over FOIA's effect on ADR confidentiality has been a
significant deterrent to use of the process. 126 While such a chilling effect on
the use of ADR in agency adjudications has undoubtedly occurred,
particularly in arbitration, 127 this explanation is also dubious. Several
agencies including the Army Corps of Engineers, Air Force Civilian
Appellate Review Agency and. the Federal Aviation Administration have
utilized ADR consistently since the promulgation of the 1990 Act. 128 The
use of ADR in these agencies has provided numerous opportunities for
nonlitigants to use FOIA to uncover sensitive documents submitted in the
course of an ADR proceeding. As stated above, counsel to agency
adjudications are hardly novices, and likely would not refrain from utilizing
FOIA as a means for uncovering such information. While the lack of FOIA
123 See id.
124 Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2741 (1990).
125 See Grunewald, supra note 31, at 999.
126 See id. at 999-1000.
127 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
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challenges may not indicate that the 1990 Act was ideal, it represents at the
very least that the lack of a FOIA exemption did not create a windfall
method of receiving confidential information.
With this in mind, the question must be asked whether the FOIA
exemption created by the 1996 Act was necessary at all. Under the 1990
Act, the test for confidentiality was whether the item in question fit within
one of the nine statutory exemptions contained in FOIA. 129 While FOIA
does not contain an explicit exemption for ADR proceedings, Exemptions 4
and 5 of FOIA sufficiently protect the confidentiality of parties to a
government ADR proceeding-Exemption 5 protects the government, while
Exemption 4 protects the disclosure concerns of private litigants.130
Under Exemption 5, any "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency" are exempted from disclosure. 131
Thus, any communication between two or more agencies or within a single
agency will be exempted from disclosure under Exemption 5. The purpose
of this exemption is to protect all documents used in the deliberative
process of government before the government issues its official policy. As
stated by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 132
Exemption 5 "is designed to encourage a free and candid exchange of ideas
during the process of decisionmaking and to prevent predecisional
disclosure of incipient policy or decisions that could disrupt agency
procedures."1 33 This privilege ensures that agencies will not be "chilled"
from conducting honest policy debates, as were it not for this privilege,
"too many analyses would be stillborn or wishy-washy.'1 34
129 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1994).
130 In addition to Exemptions 4 and 5, Exemption 6 for "personal and medical files
and similar fies the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy," and Exemption 8 for documents "contained in or related to
examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of
an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions" also
cover many documents that parties might seek to keep confidential. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(6), (8) (1994).
131 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994).
132 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
133 Id. at 151.
134 Quarles v. Dep't of the Navy, 893 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also
JAMES T. O'REuLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DIscLosuRE § 15.01 (1996) (stating that
"Congress was encouraged by the bureaucracy to avoid requiring agency policy debates
to be conducted in a publicly accessible foram, with self-serving memoranda written for
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This exemption has been interpreted very broadly by the courts. The
Supreme Court in particular has given considerable deference to privileges
against disclosure of internal government documents. 135 In FTC v. Grolier
Inc., 136 the Court held that Exemption 5 incorporates all civil discovery
privileges because allowing parties to obtain material that is normally
privileged via FOIA would effectively permit the use of FOIA to supplant
civil discovery.137 Employees of the agency are not the only persons who
may invoke the privilege-the statements of outside consultants within
agency files are also protected from disclosure under Exemption 5 when
consultants are deliberating on agency policy. 138 Even purely factual
records are privileged from disclosure under Exemption 5 if such
documents are "inextricably intertwined" with recommendations, 139 are of
sufficient significance in a lengthy record of scientific data, 14° or underlie
the basis for subjective recommendations within an agency. 141 Under such
liberal interpretations of Exemption 5, all an agency must demonstrate in
order to withhold sensitive documents is that the document was in some
way connected to deliberation over a final policy decision.142 This
future observers rather than for the honest discussion of the issues.").
135 See O'REmLLY, supra note 134, § 15.01.
136 462 U.S. 19 (1983).
137 See also United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 798 (1984);
Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 354 (1979); Renegotiation Board
v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975) (holding that "Exemption
5 incorporates the privileges which the Government enjoys under the relevant statutory
and case law in the pretrial discovery context."); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86
(1973).
138 See CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(stating that "courts have repeatedly found that a privilege attaches to reports of
outsiders commissioned by an agency to perform agency work, when such reports
would be protected if compiled within the agency itself."); Ryan v. Department of
Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078
n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Conoco, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 521 F. Supp. 1301, 1305
(D. Del. 1981).
139 See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 108 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Wolfe v.
Department of HHS, 839 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
140 See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
141 See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979); Theriault v.
United States, 503 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1974).
142 See O'REiLLY, supra note 134, § 15.01 (stating that "a record can on its face
not seem deliberative but the agency could meet its burden to show deliberation had
occurred and this document was part of the process").
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exemption thus fully protects the confidentiality of agency documents.
Rather than providing the agency with peace of mind regarding disclosure,
the new exemption in effect grants the agencies carte blanche to withhold
documents that were not anticipated by FOIA.
In the same manner in which Exemption 5 protects agency
confidentiality concerns, Exemption 4 likewise fully protects the
confidentiality concerns of private parties to an ADR proceedirig with the
federal government. Under this exemption, all "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged
or confidential" are exempted from disclosure under FOIA.143 Exemption 4
therefore exempts all documents that are (1) trade secrets, (2) commercial
or financial information and (3) subject to a common law privilege or
confidential in nature. Like Exemption 5 caselaw, courts have applied an
extremely broad reading to Exemption 4.
Trade secret claims under Exemption 4 are determined in the same
manner as trade secret claims in ordinary commercial cases. 144 Such claims
are generally governed by the Restatement of Torts, section 757, comment
b, which provides that a trade secret "may consist of... information
which is used in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." 145
Courts are very reluctant to divulge any information that might potentially
constitute a loss of a trade secret to a company. As stated by Judge Gesell,
then of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, "[t]he public
interest is, clearly, that you don't take people's property under process and
throw it around indiscriminately to people who haven't done any work for
it, haven't shown any initiative, and haven't done anything to create it." 146
Agencies are even more reluctant to divulge trade secrets in an Exemption
4 proceeding.147
The commercial or financial information standard also does not present
an onerous burden to private parties. In MIA-Com Info. Systems v. HHS,148
143 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1994).
144 See O'REmILY, supra note 134, § 14.04.
145 Id.
146 Judge Gesell Speaks His Mind as Insulation Makers Fight Trade Secret
Turnover, FTC: WATCH (Washington Regulatory Reporting Group, Inc., Washington,
D.C.), Jan. 26, 1979, at 8.
147 See O'RILY, supra note 134, § 14.04 (stating that "[iln practice, if an agency
sees a colorable claim of trade secret status, the exemption (b)(4) claim should be
invoked").
148 656 F. Supp. 691 (D.D.C. 1986).
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for example, the court held that Exemption 4 applies for any commercial
information demonstrated by a private party:
[I]t is in the public interest to encourage settlement negotiations in matters
of this kind and it would impair the ability of HHS to carry out its
governmental duties if disclosure of this kind of material under FOIA
were required. Thus, while the commercial information may be slight, it
should be protected under the exemption. 149
The drafters of Exemption 4 also created a separate category of
protection for documents that might not be commercial, but which relate
directly or indirectly to financial matters of the private litigant. Examples of
protected financial information documents include an individual's salary, 150
credit status 151 and sources of personal income. 152
In addition to showing the existence of a trade secret, commercial or
financial information, the information sought to be withheld must be subject
to a common law privilege or be confidential in nature. The privilege
requirement includes all privileges recognized in federal statutes, rules,
common law or in the Constitution. 153 Privileges recognized by the courts
have included civil discovery privileges, attorney-client privilege, attorney
work product, doctor-patient privilege, self-evaluative studies and lender-
borrower documents. 154 Indeed, courts have evinced little reluctance to
withhold privileged documents under Exemption 4.155
The primary battleground for Exemption 4 cases has been fought over
the confidentiality component of the statute. In National Parks and
149 Id. at 692-693 (emphasis added).
150 See 9 to 5 Organization for Women Office Workers v. Federal Reserve Sys.,
721 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
151 See Stone v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 552 F.2d 132 (5th Cir.
1977).
152 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
153 See Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. Block, 755 F.2d 397, 400 (5th Cir.
1985).
154 See United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 798 (1984) (civil
discovery privilege); Washington Post Co. v. HHS, 865 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(self-evaluative studies); Artesian Indus. Inc. v. HHS, 646 F. Supp. 1004, 1009
(D.D.C. 1986) (attorney-client); Indian Law Resource Ctr. v. Department of the
Interior, 477 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D.D.C. 1979) (attorney work product).
155 See O'REILLY, supra note 134, § 14.05 (examining privileges recognized by
federal courts and concluding that "the future potential of the 'privileged' category is
great").
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Conservation Ass'n v. Morton,156 the D.C. Circuit created a two part test
for determining whether a document submitted by a private party to the
government is confidential. According to the court:
[C]ommercial or financial matter is "confidential" for purposes of the
exemption if disclosure of the information is likely to have either of the
following effects: (1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain
necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the
competitive position of the person from whom the information was
obtained. 157
National Parks thus enables a private party to attain confidentiality
where disclosure will either impair the government's ability to obtain
needed information in the future, or will cause "substantial harm" to the
private party. Courts have exempted a wide array of documents from
disclosure under this standard. Under the first prong, documents will be
classified as confidential if it is demonstrated that disclosure will impair the
government's ability to procure needed information from that private party
in the future. The D.C. Circuit has applied a balancing test to determine
impairment, measuring the "rough balance of the extent of impairment and
the importance of the information against the public interest in
disclosure."1 58 Under such a standard, all the private party need show is
that the government's interest in the documents outweighs the need for
disclosure to the requesting party. 159
The preponderance of litigation over the confidentiality question has
been centered around the second facet of National Parks, which provides
that no documents shall be disclosed where substantial harm will result to
the party submitting the documents. The harm that qualifies a record under
this exception is only a likelihood of harm to the private party relative to
other competing companies or organizations. 160 It is not required that actual
harm result in order to prevent disclosure. 161 Indeed, injury need not be a
156 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
157 Id. at 770.
158 Washington Post v. HHS, 865 F.2d 320, 326-327 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
159 See Bartholdi Cable Co. v. FCC, 114 F.3d 274, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(upholding the withholding of documents by the FCC under Exemption 4 because of the
government's "compelling interest in the information at issue.").
160 See O'REILLY, supra note 134, § 14.11.
161 See e.g. Orion Research v. EPA, 615 F.2d 551, 553-554 (1st Cir. 1980); Gulf
& W. Indus. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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certainty, nor must extrinsic evidence of injury be presented. As stated by
the D.C. Circuit, "[i]n order to show the likelihood of substantial
competitive harm, it is not necessary to show actual competitive harm.
Actual competition and the likelihood of substantial competitive injury is all
that need be shown." 162
In Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC,163 the D.C. Circuit made the
substantial harm test even more favorable to private parties by invoking
protection for any communication submitted voluntarily to an agency. The
court reasoned:
It is a matter of common sense that the disclosure of information that the
Government has secured from voluntary sources on a confidential basis
will both jeopardize its continuing ability to secure such data on a
cooperative basis and injure the provider's interest in preventing its
unauthorized release. Accordingly ... we conclude that financial or
commercial information provided to the Government on a voluntary basis
is "confidential" for the purpose of Exemption 4 if it is of a kind that
would customarily not be released to the public by the person for whom it
was obtained. 164
Although Critical Mass has been criticized by many as a means for
allowing private parties to keep documents confidential by merely
voluntarily submitting them to the agency, the case further ensures that
confidential information not normally released to the public remains
protected under an agency ADR proceeding.
Employing Exemptions 4 and 5 together, an agency can be assured of
the confidentiality of its documents as long as they are used in deliberation
of an eventual agency policy, while private litigants' documents are
exempted from disclosure if they contain trade secrets or commercial
information of any kind and are privileged or will cause harm to the party
or the government. These exemptions are completely inclusive in their
protection of ADR communications and, rather than parties' ignorance of
the law or the chilling effect caused by the former ADR Act, provide the
best explanation for why no disputes arose over the FOIA standard for
confidentiality under the 1990 Act. The new FOIA exemption serves only
162 Gulf & W. Indus., 615 F.2d at 530. See also National Parks Ass'n v. Kleppe,
547 F.2d 673, 678-679 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Timken Co. v. Customs Serv., 491 F. Supp.
557, 559 (D.D.C. 1980).
163 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
164 Id. at 879.
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to improperly exempt documents which are properly available to the public
under FOLA.
Creation of a FOIA exemption under 1996 Act will have a greater
effect than merely adding duplicative and inconsistent regulations,
however. The broad sweep of the new § 5740) will be subject to abuse
from parties to an ADR proceeding, who will now be able to exclude
communications that would otherwise be public record in a formal
adjudication. This result is contrary to the core purpose of FOIA, which is
to allow the public to know "what their government is up to" 165 and serves
to greatly reduce government accountability and accessibility.
The potential for abuse under the language of the 1996 Act was
recognized by the conference committee which instituted the bill's final
changes. 166 The committee realized that the FOIA exemption could lead to
misuse by the parties:
The Managers recognize that the intent of the Conference Agreement
not to exempt from disclosure under FOIA a dispute resolution
communication given by one party to another party could easily be
thwarted if a neutral in receipt of a dispute resolution communication
agrees with a party to in turn to pass the communication on to another
party. It is the intent of the Managers that if the neutral attempts to
circumvent the prohibitions of the ADR Act in this manner, the exemption
from FOIA would not apply.... The Managers would not expect the
parties to use the new exemption as a mere sham to exempt information
from FOIA. 167
Although it may be the intent of the committee that the "mere sham"
use of the FOIA exemption not be permitted, enforcement of this borders
on the impossible. Parties will now be able to avoid disclosure of
communications that do not fall within the intended sweep of the FOIA
exemption-those between the parties themselves-merely by passing the
communication through the neutral, and having him pass the
communication to the other party. If the confidentiality of such a
communication is sufficiently important, it is foreseeable that parties may
now resort to ADR merely to avoid publicly divulging information that
would otherwise be available in a formal adjudication. This was obviously
165 Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 773 (1989).
166 See H.R. REP. No. 104-841, at 8.
167 Id.
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not the intent of the 1996 Act, but it is a real and very dangerous potential
consequence of the new FOIA exemption.168
Assume for example that a well-known manufacturer is involved in
litigation with EPA for clean-up costs under the Clean Air Act. 169 Under a
formal adjudication, the manufacturer would have to submit evidence for
the public record disclosing its emission levels in order to show that they do
not fall below the level established by the Act. Such a submission might
show that the company has achieved the allowable level by balancing lower
emission levels in certain areas in order to counteract, or "offset" as the
term has come to be known, higher emissions in other areas. 170 Because
this is information that the manufacturer would obviously like to keep
secret from residents living in the area where the higher emissions are
present, it could encourage use of ADR in order to keep this information
confidential. All the manufacturer would have to do under the 1996 Act is
simply stipulate that all communications in the ADR proceeding will be
made through the neutral, a common request in ADR. Under such a
scenario, the utility of ADR has been defeated, as rather than being entered
into for efficiency purposes, ADR has been used to reduce public
knowledge and government accountability by permitting a manufacturer to
impermissibly achieve confidentiality. Foreseeable scenarios such as these
exhibit how the 1996 Act, in its attempt to "balance" openness in
government with the parties' need for confidentiality, has erred on the side
of confidentiality, with the general public the loser as a result.
V. CONCLUSION
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 was created with
the intent of broadening the use of ADR in agency adjudications. That such
an increase in the use of ADR was needed is confirmed by the overall
paucity of ADR use during the course of the 1990 Act. The concern
expressed in this Note, however, is that in opening the door for greater
ADR use, the bipartisan congressional effort which resulted in the 1996 Act
may have gone too far at the expense of public accountability. Binding
arbitration is likely to result in the arbitration of public policy issues which
the private neutral is ill-equipped to handle. The decision of the private
168 See id.
169 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1994) (establishing, among other things,
permissible pollutant discharge levels).
170 See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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neutral, therefore, will not always correspond to public values. Expansion
of the confidentiality of ADR communications created by the FOIA
exemption also reduces accountability by concealing communications that
would otherwise be public record. While these changes may be a step
forward for ADR in agency adjudications, they are likely to represent two
steps back in terms of providing public access and accountability in
government.

